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Critical Corpse Studies
Engaging with Corporeality
and Mortality in Curriculum
Mark Helmsing & Cathryn van Kessel
Abstract
This article focuses on the pedagogical questions we might consider when
teaching with and about corpses. Whereas much recent posthumanist writing in
educational research takes up the Deleuzian question “what can a body do?,” this
article investigates what a dead body can do for students’ encounters with life and
death across the curriculum. The article calls attention to how a corpse’s pedagogical
force functions as as a kind of curricular text. The authors present four different
types of curricular encounters with corpses: curricular encounters of disgust, curricular encounters with denial, curricular encounters with dis/re-membering, and
curricular encounters with disruption. educators to imagine how they might engage
with corpses and corporeal through an enhanced sense of mortality in helpful
ways. The authors suggest that a worthy curricular aim is not to simply de-center
the valorization of life as a triumphant finish and logical conclusion but instead to
teach how life in a larger, more exciting and terrifying complexity, continues into
and beyond death.

On Death’s Door: An Introduction
What might emerge from rethinking human bodies, particularly in terms of
how they function beyond our mortal coil? Although humans are prone to squishing down and defending against affective and emotional reactions to the subject of
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mortality, persevering in these initially troubling reactions provides an opportunity
for different relations with each other as well as other entities on this planet (as well as
the planet itself). This posthuman perspective suggests death “is not the teleological
destination of life, a sort of ontological magnet that propels us forward” (Braidotti,
2013, p. 133), and the figure of the corpse thrust the concept of human into this ontological opportunity. Wallin (2016) indicates this when he suggests curriculum studies
must respond to a “thanatonic scene,” a scene in which curriculum thought must be
rested away from moribund, deadening apparatuses of school, technical rationalism,
standardization, and other deadly dull devices of control and governmentality. Wallin
(2013) tracks this other possible ‘life’ of curriculum in his concept of deadagogy,
that considers death’s potential for resistance, experimentation, revolt(ing) protest,
and other educative commitments. Inspired by this notion of dedagogy, we explore
in this article what curriculum studies can learn from dead bodies—the figure of the
corpse—in our present intellectual moment when curriculum theorists are thinking
with and through the posthuman (Gough, 2004; Lewis & Kahn, 2010; Snaza &
Weaver, 2014; Zembylas, 2018), transhuman (Bradley, 2018), inhuman (Springgay
& Truman, 2017; Truman, 2019), and more-than-human (Schulte, 2019).
Before we proceed further, we should note that in this article we discuss in frank
and vivid ways the affects and effects of corpses and related aspects of death, dying,
and decay. Following how Haraway (2016) encourages us to stay with the trouble of
“living and dying together on a damaged earth” (p. 143), we also encourage readers
to stay with us in these arguments. However, we acknowledge how the affects and
effects of death, corpses, and corporeality have the potential to elicit trauma and
traumatic intensities and wish to caution readers of the contents of our article as
having the capacity to overwhelm, disturb, and trouble beyond the reader’s desire
for such intensities.
The editors of this special issue highlight affects and effects of waste by asking
curriculum scholars to consider “the rejected, the dross, the chucked, and/or the
useless.” We find these affects of waste in certain humanist notions of bodies and
corpses. First, humans reject corpses and want nothing to do with them. A person
cannot eat, fuck, or love a corpse, as a curriculum history of the corpse would attest.
Recall history teaching us the taboos of cannibalism in the Donner Party (Brown,
2009; Wallis, 2017) and the taboos of necrophilia, as in the renewed cultural interest
in Jeffrey Dahmer (Backderf, 2012; Meyers, 2017). Secondly, as Schwartz (2015)
instructs us, we often think of corpses as useless because, as lifeless bodies, they
no longer appear to possess agency and subjectivity, becoming husks or shells once
life ends. Taking this further, Kristeva (1980/1982) suggests a corpse is “that thing
that no longer matches and therefore no longer signifies anything” (p. 4). To be sure,
neither Schwartz (2015) nor Kristeva (1980/1982) are suggesting here that corpses
are useless, but we take their claims as our starting point to reject humanist ideas
that corpses are useless and must be jettisoned from conversation, polite talk, talk
at school and in the home.
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Pushing back on this situation, we seek to illustrate in this article all that a
corpse has to teach us about mortality through corporeality. Sonu and Snaza (2015)
call our attention in how “to educate in ways that attune to the human as entangled
with the more-than-human without hypostasising “the human” as if it were separate
or separable” (p. 262). Following their call, we demonstrate in this article how we
can thrust ourselves into a species-level humility needed as climate catastrophe
looms along with its associated hardships on every entity on the planet. We can
position education away from a denial of death and towards de-escalating harmful
social and environmental processes without privileging educators (or any human)
as savior (van Kessel, 2018, 2019).
To do so, through several examples of how corpses render death educatively
as a reminder of life, we discuss how educators might read the corpse as a site of
curriculum for death through four curricular modes: disgust, denial, dis-membering,
and disruption. First, we provide some theoretical considerations for death, mortality, and corporeality in curriculum thought, examining which bodies are present
in curriculum as we dig down into the curriculum of the corpse itself. Next, we
examine the fluids that ooze out of bodies and corpses that engage us educationally
as a curricular mode of disgust. Following this, we probe the logic of mortality
through a curricular mode of denial emerging in human encounters with corpses
and the corporeal. Third, we describe possibilities of communing with the dead
that emerge in a curricular mode of dis-membering with corpses, attending to what
the corpse dis-members and allows the living to re-member through attachments
with and of the corpse. Fourth, once learners move through disgust, denial, and
dis-membering, they must contend with corporeality and mortality as a curriculum
of affirmative disruption that serves to (positively) disrupt the humanist boundaries
of a corpse. Finally, we conclude our article with a call for educators to imagine
how they might engage with corpses and corporeal through an enhanced sense of
mortality in helpful ways. Our aim throughout the act of curriculum theorizing on
offer in our article is not simply to de-center the valorization of life as a triumphant
finish and logical conclusion but to teach how life in a larger, more exciting and
terrifying complexity, continues into and beyond death.

Framing the Corpse as a Site of Curriculum:
Theoretical Considerations
The starting point for our argument is that there are many forms of human
bodies normalized in curriculum: abled bodies; highly functioning and successful
bodies; the glorified bodies of heroes and leaders (who even in death are “still with
us” in history); and the valorization of life in biology (with a focus on life and how
life begins, evolves, unfolds). Brooks (1993) accounts for these different kinds of
bodies as “heroic, sacred, suffering, tragic… pornographic, even moribund” (p. 5).
All of these bodies that champion life as the triumphant outcome and reward for
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merely existing as human crash face a limit when we think about the forms of life
minimized, excluded, and avoided in curriculum. However, as Brooks goes on to
claim, “the primacy of the body is most dramatically felt in its failure,” its death
and destruction (p. 5). These bodies serve as “a site of signification—the place for
an inscription of stories—and itself a signifier, a prime agent in narrative plot and
meaning” (Brooks, 1993, pp. 5-6). Thus, the humanist notion of a body breaks
down when we think of the body as a corpse.
While a corpse is still a body, it functions differently in that it dissolves the self,
complicating what some may take for granted as “the tendential connectivity of the
living and the dead” (Locke, 2016, p. 72). The binary opposition of the living and
the dead constrains what we think a body can do. Curriculum theory “wastes” many
potential sites and scenarios for exploration, investigation, meditation, introspection,
examination, and rumination on boundaries and passages of life and death when
we set up rigid dichotomies that privilege states of being alive over being dead,
or, as some curriculum scholars demonstrate, being undead in curriculum thought
(Black, Gray, & Leahy, 2016; Flinders, 2016; Huddleston, 2016; Urmacher, 2014).
When curriculum studies scholars choose to prioritize the liberal humanist
subject of life, living, and the human, it presents the humanist subject as a living
body, in a way that Edwards (2018) describes as “an exceptional entity who exists
apart from a world of animals and things and whose fate can be directed by the
rationalist will” (p. 5). In this set-up, death and dying are excluded and rendered
as a binary opposite of the human subject. When you are no longer human you are
dead, inside and otherwise. Working against this limited perspective, we argue for
productive educational engagements with death that engage with a species humility
informed, in part, by Ernest Becker (1973, 1975) and Eugene Thacker (2011, 2015a,
2015b). These engagements help us embrace our fluid nature in death and life,
providing a way to affirmatively examine our lives. In this way, a corpse (although
frequently considered to be non-agentic, having ‘wasted’-away) is at the heart of
what might be considered educational. This affirmative examination of the corpse
maps on to how Braidotti (2013) thinks about death as:
a creative synthesis of flows, energies and perpetual becoming…. The full blast
of the awareness of the transitory nature of all that lives is the defining moment
in our existence. It structures our becoming-subjects, our capacity and powers of
relation and the process of acquiring ethical awareness. (pp. 131-132)

Part of this ethical awareness involves effecting a posthumanist change in the body’s
status from subject to object and decentering what we see as a subject, such as the
sacred position living human bodies occupy in curriculum studies. One example of
this awareness is in what Alaimo (2010, 2018) calls trans-corporeality, by which she
means “that all creatures, as embodied beings, are intermeshed with the dynamic,
material world, which crosses through them, transforms them, and is transformed
by them” (2018, p. 435). This concept inspires the aim of our article in moving
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curriculum thought away from the human as a “master subject of Western humanist
individualism, who imagines himself as transcendent, disembodied and removed
from the world he surveys” (Alaimo, 2018, p. 436). Replacing a view that chiefly
considers how to improve and perfect the man-as-human-master, a view that foreground mortality and corporeality affirms death along with “the strange agencies
that interconnect substance, flesh and place” (Alaimo, 2018, p. 436). In the sections
that follow, we provide several examples to illustrate how curriculum studies can
position corpses as interconnected objects that never remove the learner-as-human
from the scene of thinking, but, rather, re-positions the learner-as-human as a less
forceful and powerful force, one actant of many actants in the world.
But the human(ist) relationship to death is a fraught one and moving quickly
towards a kind of trans-corporeality that Alaimo and other posthumanist scholars call
for is not necessarily an easy move to make. This is because of a deeply human(ist)
aversion to facing death, a denial of death we discuss in detail in section three of this
article. This denial works on multiple levels. Derrida (1993) gestures towards this
denial when he points out that “[f]or us, in the West, within our borders, death would
be, and increasingly so, almost prohibited, dissimulated, disposed of, and denied”
stemming from a “certain incapacity to look death in the face” (p. 57-58). Agreeing
with Derrida, we wonder about why education, and curriculum in particular, supports
such deep incapacities to look death in the face and confront it, read about it, think
about it, talk about it, feel about it, and write about it when, in our present moment,
death is inescapable within spaces of learning, from school shootings to youth suicide,
from pep rallies for students with cancer to the drudgery and normalization of death
when dissecting specimens of dead animals in a school biology lab.
Thus, a more affirmative and productive engagement with death is necessary
to achieve a level of thought in which the human body becomes not a marker, but
a conduit. We find that within curriculum theory and curriculum studies death has
not often been a prominent conceptual concern of the field. Both Britzman (2002)
and Snaza (2014) have in their own ways wrestled with issues of ghosts, spectrality,
haunting, and death as structuring forces of curriculum studies through provocative
and compelling engagements with death and curriculum. We, the authors of this
article, follow these and other curriculum scholars in examining issues of death,
corpses, and the corporeal, a collaborative project we are engaged in with colleagues
in an ongoing project of death in social studies education. In the four sections to
which we now turn, we cast our focus close to the corpse and its association with
death as we consider how death, dying, and creaturely features of the corpse such
as fluids and remains can alter foundational questions of curriculum. We agree
with Wallin (2016) in asserting that “curriculum shares with ethics the fundamental question of how to live, or rather, how a life might go” (p. 39) and we take this
questioning to the grave, so to speak, in considering how a life goes on after death
and through the corpse.
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Corporeality and Mortality as a Curriculum of Disgust
A critical study of corpses must first attend to that which corpses are most
often considered to do—revile and disgust—which is a common human reaction
to the complex processes of transformation bodies undergo upon death rendering
them into corpses. One aspect of the corpse associated with disgust is the process of
decomposition a body undergoes immediately upon death. The decomposition of a
body as it transforms into a corpse is a long process that occurs through sequential
stages of pallor mortis (soon after death as the body becomes pale and discolored
due to the loss of blood circulation); algor mortis (when the body becomes cold to
the touch once an internal temperature can no longer be regulated); rigor mortis
(when the body stiffens and tenses due to cellular changes in muscle tissue); livor
mortis (when blood settles and pools in the lower portion of the body from gravity
when blood flow stops). This process is followed by putrefaction and decomposition
(when the corpse turns green from gases filling the body and compounds such as
cadaverine and putrescine are released into the corpse) that then leads to final stages of skeletonization and fossilization of the corpse (Cohut, 2018; Suazo, 2017).
Central to this accounting for the body’s becoming-corpse is the nature of fluids
with(in) a corpse, such as blood, pus, dissolved membranes, slime, and embalming
fluids. These fluids circulate around and within the corpse as a site of curriculum
through their affective intensity. In this section, we discuss how one aspect of the
corpse as a site of curriculum is in how we respond to bodily fluids, often seen in
discharges and viscera, in forceful ways.
Our precognitive reaction is likely linked to our uneasiness about our creatureliness and associated mortality: “Mortality is connected to the natural, animal
side of his existence; and so man reaches beyond and away from that side. So much
that he tries to deny it completely” (Becker, 1975, p. 92). Our visceral reaction to
bodily fluids, in part, stems from its reminder of our animality and thus our status
as finite creatures. As Kristeva (1980/1982) noted,
The corpse (or cadaver: cadere, to fall), that which has irremediably come a cropper, is cesspool, and death; it upsets even more violently the one who confronts
it as fragile and fallacious chance. A wound with blood and pus, or the sickly,
acrid smell of sweat, of decay, does not signify death… corpses show me what I
permanently thrust aside in order to live. (p. 3)

This reaction to seeing a corpse is, upon Kristeva’s description of it, an unpleasant
reaction, one that “upsets” in her words. While we would suggest not all encounters
with a corpse are de facto unpleasant encounters, we agree with Kristeva that when
we encounter a corpse much of our humanist learning sputters out of control. We fill
up with irrational thoughts, feelings, and affects: How could this be? What happened
to this body? What circumstances have brought me into contact with this corpse?
Seeing (and smelling, feeling, sensing) the corpse may cause us to cry, tear up,
retch, race our heart rate, make our breathing heavy, turn knots in our stomach, or
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even laugh—especially that kind of spasmodic, inappropriate laughter out of discomfort associated with encounters of the grotesque (Edwards & Graulund, 2013).
(Over)reactions that serve to deny our fluid (and mortal) nature are embodied
in the example of how followers of the Greek god Dionysos (or “Bacchus” to the
Romans) were treated. Dionysos, was a god of fluids—not only wine and honey
(bee vomit!), but also (as a fertility god) semen, vaginal arousal fluid, breastmilk,
and so on. Plutarch comments upon the god as not tied to nature (physis), but
specifically to fluid nature (hygra physis):
Clearly, what Plutarch has in mind by this phrase are all of the flowering, dripping,
throbbing, sluicing, gurgling forms which the force of life takes in nature, as water,
milk, semen, blood, amniotic fluid, honey, saliva, sap, and the special gift from
Dionysos himself, wine. (Meagher, 1995, p. 72)

Although ancient Greek culture is a shadow of its former self—at times even
confined to cartoon form—it is an important reminder that Dionysos was not just
a god of sex, drugs, and rock ‘n roll, but rather keenly linked to bodily fluids and
death. Dionysos (in the Orphic tradition) was killed and dismembered by the Titans,
then resurrected—akin to Orpheus travelling to Hades and returning. Dionysos was
linked to death, and ancient Greek society saw death as unclean: “those affected
[by death] are impure and are excluded for a certain amount of time from normal
life” (Burkert, 1985, p. 79). The followers of Dionysos were also excluded by the
dominant culture—perhaps due to his connections with the mortal bodies and their
fluids. By the second century BCE, the Bacchanalian mysteries had come under
scrutiny by the government and eventually outlawed. The Roman historian Livy
(1970) noted that the Bacchic cult is not part of “authentic” Roman religion; for
example, the cult is called a prava religio and is counted among dangerous foreign
religions (39.16.6-10). The followers of Bacchus were “a people apart, on the fringe
of the Populus Romanus, like the Christian church later on: a separatism that was
heavy with menace” (Turcan, 1997, p. 303), and the visible presence of women was
explained by the Roman historian Livy as due to their susceptibility “to religious
frenzy” (Edwards, 1993, p. 44). In 186 BCE, nocturnal meetings and fires were
banned, and access in and out of Rome was strictly monitored, and those involved
in the cult of Bacchus were interrogated and punished. All Bacchic shrines in Italy,
with the exception of altars and idols, were destroyed (Turcan, 1997).
Was the fluid nature of Bacchus and the cult the source of anxiety? Gruen
(1990) noted that the Bacchic cult was beyond governmental control, and Livy
used the word coniuratio which implies “subversion.” Despite its long-standing
presence in Italy, the cult is described as having “alien rites” (Gruen, 1990, p. 48),
and in plays of Plautus those who belong to the cult as seen as violent revelers who
are irrational. Of particular note is a quote from his play, The Bacchides that hints
at the fluid aspects of the cult: “… sorores, quae hominum sorbent sanguinem”
(Gruen, 1990, p. 50). These, “sisters, who suck the blood of men” are female Bac-
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chantes, and perhaps this quote indicates the existential terror the cult inspired in
the (supposedly) rational patriarchy of Rome.
The association between women’s particular connection to fluids, and thus
creaturely aspects of nature, has repercussions in contemporary times. Roberts
and colleagues (2002) measured how reminders of menstruation can lead to more
negative reactions to women and increased objectification. In this study, a female
member of the study team “accidentally” dropped either a tampon or hair clip out
in front of participants, who were unaware that this occurrence was part of the
research. When asked to evaluate her after the (fake part of) study, the results were
disheartening. Dropping the tampon led to: lower evaluations of her competence,
decreased liking for her, a tendency to avoid sitting near her, and increased objectification of women in general. Such findings align with what we know about
aspects of sexism and misogyny: “Because of menstruation, pregnancy, and lactation, women are perceived as more closely tied to nature, and, at least in Western
culture, this perception has been used to distinguish them from men, and ultimately
to devalue them” (Roberts et al., 2002, p. 131). In order for these humans who
lactate and have menstrual blood to become less of an existential threat (i.e., lessen
their reminders of our creatureliness), their bodily fluids must be hidden and their
bodies made into objects more so than creatures of nature. This objectification (in
a very particular sense) explains why voluptuous near-bare breasts are considered
(by many-but-not-all) to be acceptable for a store window advertisement, and yet
a woman nursing a child with an exposed nipple might be (illogically) deemed to
be indecent (Ussher, 1989; Yalom, 1997). Our fluids remind us that we are finite
creatures subject to death.
Fluids seem integral to our perception of bodies, otherwise we are “just skin
and bones,” and perhaps it is our reaction to those fluids that produce the most
heightened affective and emotional responses—a corpse, after all, elicits a response
different from a dry skeleton. Similar to how, because of their connection to fluids,
some Romans responded to the followers of Dionysos, as well as how contemporary
societies continue to treat women in harmful ways, we can fervently react to affects
of zombies. Ndalianis (2012) embodies this affect when she contrasts how the dead
bodies of vampires and zombies function differently as potential sexual partners.
Vampire lovers are seductive, but if one were to rewrite a similar sex scene with
a zombie, the affect would evoke disgust and revulsion—the congealing blood as
the rotting flesh is peeled away, the smell and ooze of decomposition as it mingles
with saliva and sweat:
Her nails dug into his shoulders, and she felt the flesh give way, her fingers
plunging inwards. She felt her fingertips touch a squishy, sticky substance and
the first thing she notices when she pulled her hands away was the rancid, nauseating stench. Peering over her shoulder she gazed at her nails, which had pulled
out with them bits of torn, rotting flesh, and her fingers dripped with an oozing,
green substance… (p. 95)
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This scene, had it been with a vampire would still be risqué in its bodily fluid exchange (e.g., blood as well as perhaps semen and vaginal fluid), but not to the same
extent. Although eroticism breaks taboos, it clearly lies in the domain of (living)
human bodies (Bataille, 1986). Vampires walk a:
fine line between life and death, but this teasing ultimately favors erotic life and
undying passion. The zombie, on the other hand, steps firmly into the realm of
death and, through the carnal presence of its animated and putrefying corpse, is
a reminder to the living (both diegetic and beyond the diegesis) of what awaits
them when life comes to an end. (Ndalianis, 2012, p. 97)

Although any fluid can remind us of our mortality, not every fluid does this to the
same extent. The average person does not seem terribly affected by blood from a
paper cut (although it is indeed unpleasant), and yet, returning to the menstruation
example, menstrual blood elicits a strong response. Vampires, although sexual
creatures, walk the line of what might be acceptable more delicately than zombies.
Zombies ooze a variety of fluids in uncontrolled ways, while vampires’ bodies remain more intact. Perhaps a comparison can be made to women’s breasts. Cleavage
is just sexual enough—teasing us about our potentially wild, sexual nature—while
many consider nipples and areole to be too far. Vampires tease us with death while
zombies slap us in the face with it. Particular fluids in situations where they are
more untamed can be potent reminders of death, and zombie corpses tend to have
these oozing liquids in abundance.
Considering the examples in this section—Bacchantes, women, and zombies—
how might we engage with fluids like semen, blood, and breastmilk in ways that
affirm life instead of denying death? We are arguing here in this paper that corpses
provide a literal and figurative site for such educational endeavors. Returning to the
ideas from Edwards (2018) at the beginning of our article, we see (and feel) corpses
as an opportunity to trouble the liberal humanist subject of life “as an exceptional
entity who exists apart from a world of animals and things and whose fate can be
directed by the rationalist will” (p. 5).
As revolting and disgusting as most accounts are of seeing, smelling, and
sensing a decomposing corpse and its fluids, even the affects of a corpse’s fluids
are not neat and clean guarantees of disgust. Doughty (2014) draws upon her years
of experience as a mortician to explain to lay readers the curriculum of mortuary
science and mortuary work. The scent of a decomposing corpse, in her words, is a
complex one:
[T]he first note of a putrefying human body is of licorice with a strong citrus undertone. Not a fresh, summer citrus, mind you — more like a can of orange-scented
industrial bathroom spray shot directly up your nose. Add to that a day-old glass of
white wine that has begun to attract flies. Top it off with a bucket of fish left in the
sun. That [...] is what human decomposition smells like. (Doughty, 2014, p. 158)

Whereas disgust is one curricular mode activated when encountering a corpse,
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another curricular mode of the corpse relates to how humans subvert a propensity
to deny their finite creatureliness.

Corporeality and Mortality as a Curriculum of Denial
Humans (and perhaps other animals) are blessed and cursed with the knowledge
of our finite bodily existence, and reminders of our limitedness (e.g., the sight of
our bodily fluids outside our bodies) trigger our sense of creatureliness. We can
project ourselves forward in time and anticipate our death occurring in a myriad
of ways—all of which seems horrific to us. Such a situation provides us with an
opportunity to consider what, then, comprises a good life, and thus “the fact that
we die is the most important fact about us” (May, 2009, p. 4). Yet, many humans
choose instead to deny their mortality, which exacts a toll on their relations with
others as well as the planet because humans “use one another to assure their personal
victory over death” (Becker, 1975, p. 108).
According to Becker (1973), “[m]an” is “out of nature and hopelessly in it…
he [sic] sticks out of nature with a towering majesty, and yet he goes back into the
ground a few feet in order blindly and dumbly to rot and disappear forever” (p.
26). Philosopher and mathematician Blaise Pascal identified the paradox that the
more humans come to learn, the more we realize our insignificance—a situation
which calls for “species-level humility” (Thacker, 2015a, p. 165). In many ways,
humans are like our fellow animals on this planet. We eat, digest, and defecate.
We feel urges and produce sexual fluids, and some of us procreate. And then we
die. As far as the planet is concerned, each individual’s existence matters not: The
planet does not care whether we are here or not (Thacker, 2011).
This situation, however, has not prevented some humans from exacting extraordinary damage on the planet—climate catastrophe is unfolding, in part, because
many assume that the world is for humans, rather than us simply being one species
of many on a planet that is ontologically intact with or without us. Scholars from
diverging perspectives and disciplines have noted the need for many-but-not-all
humans to rethink their arrogance; for example, in relation to climate catastrophe.
Heather Davis and Zoe Todd (2017) have linked the concept of the Anthropocene
to colonialism rather than a time when humans began to use technology to damage
the planet in exacerbated ways. Drawing from their own experiences as well as
the work of Indigenous scholars, they reveal that: “the ecocidal logics that now
govern our world are not inevitable or ‘human nature’, but are the result of a series
of decisions that have their origins and reverberations in colonization” (p. 763).
The dangerous species arrogance of many-but-not-all humans continues to have
profound aspects on the planet, our societies, and even our personal lives. This
exemplifies the necrocene—an era of death and destruction of lives, cultures, and
ways of existing. McBrien (2016) calls for humans to find ways of doing better as
individuals and communities. Humility is necessary for this task and the grounding
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effects (literally and figuratively) of the corpse can position persons to engage in
this task.
Humans could be humbled by our (lack of) status, as illustrated by how Sheldon
Solomon introduces himself: “a twitching blob of respiring biological protoplasm
no more fundamentally significant or enduring than a lizard or a potato” (Reynolds,
2014) or by more ethical relations between and among the humans of the past,
present, and future, as well as our other-than-human kin (Donald, 2009; Tallbear,
2016); but, unfortunately, many humans tend to do quite the opposite. We deny our
limitedness and connectedness. As hard as we fight to claim “a towering majesty”
(often to the detriment of others), at the end of our lives our bodies turn into corpses
and return us to nature, and we do not take kindly to this knowledge, despite the
opportunity to embrace a sort of bodily humility.
Instead of accepting our finite creatureliness, we can deny it. We try to devise
ways of “transcending the world of flesh and blood… by devising an ‘invisible
project’ that would assure [our] immortality” (Becker, 1975, p. 63). We cultivate a
variety of personal immortality projects to leave an enduring imprint on the world
(e.g., having children, building monuments, accumulating academic citations), as
well as grounding ourselves in powers borrowed from those beyond us: parents,
social groups, societies, and nations. Our cultural worldview, for example, tells us
what came before us, why things are the way they are, and what will endure after
us. But the price for this reassurance is steep.
The problem with adhering to cultural worldviews and nations as an antidote
for terror is that all worldviews are to some extent arbitrary, fictional assemblages
about the nature of reality, and thus require continual validation from others in order
to remain believable. Exposure to cultures of people with alternate worldviews,
especially those that are opposed to one’s own, therefore, potentially undermines
one’s faith in the dominant worldview and the psychological protection it provides.
When our buffer against our impermanence is removed, we can react in harmful
ways. To illustrate, Harrington (1969) puts it this way:
Cruelty can arise from the aesthetic outrage we sometimes feel in the presence of
strange individuals who seem to be making out all right... Have they found some
secret passage to eternal life? It can’t be. If those weird individuals with beards and
funny hats are acceptable, then what about my claim to superiority? Can someone
like that be my equal in God’s eyes? Does he, that one, dare hope to live forever
too—and perhaps crowd me out? I don’t like it. All I know is, if he’s right I’m
wrong. So different and funny-looking. I think he’s trying to fool the gods with
his sly ways. Let’s show him up. He’s not very strong. For a start, see what he’ll
do when I poke him. (pp. 125-126)

If groups of people with opposing beliefs can be injured or killed, the implication is
that their beliefs are truly inferior to our own. Further to this point, by eliminating
large numbers of people with a different version of reality, the threatening worldview may cease to exist, and thus no longer pose a threat (e.g., Hirschberger et al.,
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2016; Pyszczynski et al., 2006; Schimel et al., 2007). Some of the most horrific
human behaviors throughout history, namely war and genocide, are examples of
annihilation as a form of worldview defense. As Baldwin (1962) aptly noted:
Perhaps the whole root of our trouble, the human trouble, is that we will sacrifice
all the beauty of our lives, will imprison ourselves in totems, taboos, crosses,
blood sacrifices, steeples, mosques, races, armies, flags, nations, in order to deny
the fact of death, which is the only fact we have. (para. 50)

We may harm (directly or indirectly) others during our quest for immortality. In the
case of nationhood, we cling to our nation and thus are prone to shunning or even
hurting those who construct reality differently. When dominant groups marginalize
other groups, the stage is set for political underrepresentation (after all, those “weird
individuals” have nothing to offer “us”) as well as oppression—the subjugation of
the abject other. According to Becker (1975) we can affirm our symbolic immortality by taking the lives of others. In this way, our corporeality is denied, in part, by
enhancing the bodily creatureliness and thus mortality of others. Mbembe (2005)
noted “the life in death” and that “the taking of the enemy’s life is the privileged
dialect of history” (p. 18). Through the idea of necropolitics, Mbembe (2003) shifted
Foucault’s idea of biopower, specifically focusing on who is allowed to live, and
who is left to die or killed: “the generalized instrumentalization of human existence
and the material destruction of human bodies and populations” (p. 14). As such,
mortality is “decoupled from the project of living—a direct relation to killing that
renders impossible any subterfuge in a hallucinating disavowal of death in modernity” (Puar, 2007, p. 33). Mbembe flipped Foucault: Instead of death as affirming
vitality, for Mbembe, death (especially death on a massive scale as in massacres)
is evidence for “the brutality of biopower’s incitement to life” (Puar, 2007, p. 33).
Perhaps this turn of phrase seems to the reader to be inconsequential at first,
and yet it more aptly explains how the death of one’s socio-political enemy can
become the primary objective. If Power ignores death, then it makes little sense to
focus on murder. Instead, it is Power that embraces the death of others—whoever
is deemed to be “not us.” Necropolitics plays upon our existential fears. Those who
threaten our nation (or other immortality projects) are evils that must be eradicated.
Our heroic quest, then, is to annihilate it. One’s own group is “pure and good” and
others “are the real animals, are spoiling everything for you, contaminating your
purity and bringing disease and weakness into your vitality” (Becker, 1975, p. 93).
Not only can lives be considered disposable, as we see in the context of precarity
and biopolitics (such as Black, Brown, and Indigenous lives in Canada and the US),
but also certain lives are seen as sacrificial in the name of immunizing the lives
of those deemed good. The use of necropolitics, for example by governments, can
manipulate and control people using “the language of survival” to gain support for
physically harming or killing others, such as during the War on Terror (Braidotti,
2013, p. 122). Not only are those deaths acceptable, but they also serve a suppos-
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edly positive function of protecting the rest of ‘us’ from harm. Such adherence to
nations as immortality projects has led to bloody wars and much human suffering.
Humans, when we are overcompensating for our mortality, can become intensely
destructive:
The thing that makes man the most devastating animal that ever stuck his neck
up into the sky is that he wants an earth that is not an earth but a heaven, and the
price for this kind of fantastic ambition is to make the earth an even more eager
graveyard than it naturally is. (Becker, 1975, p. 96)

If, as humans, we hope to accept our mortality and stop futile quests for immortality at the expense of others, then engagements with our fluid nature could be a
powerful curricular mode.

Corporeality and Mortality
as a Curriculum of Dis- and Re-membering
We can turn to a more hermeneutic orientation of curriculum that considers what
it means for the living to see another human as a member of the dead, to engage in
practices of dis-membering and re-membering that build upon the affects and feelings
created in the aftermath of denial for more affirming affective relations to mortality.
Semantically, dismembering conjures images and associations with a destructive and
violent inflection commonly encountered during scenes of instruction in a history
course: cutting off a gangrenous arm in a U.S. Civil War medic camp; decapitation
of an aristocrat at the guillotine in France; a market vendor’s leg blown off during a
suicide bombing in Afghanistan. Here, though, we consider dismemberment differently
in thinking of funerary and mortuary practices that, through specific rituals, partition
the corpse from living bodies and remove a dead body as member of a community of
living bodies, to literally dis-member from the living. Similarly, we use remembering
to refer to practices that allow a living body to recollect, recall, or reinstate a dead
body as a member of a living body’s community, practices by which the living to
commune with the dead, to rejoin the fold.
Alaimo (2010) reorients our thinking about what it means to remember in a
conventional sense, to recollect a thought or experience, by shifting the grounds
of our subjectivity through how we think of our selves as members within a living
collective, a “material world that is never merely an external place but always the
very substance of ourselves and others” (p. 158). Whereas the previous two sections
on disgust and denial use examples to break down humanist assumptions of the
bodily and the creaturely, this section remains within this more-than-human realm
of life and death to consider different objects that dis-member the human and, in
turn, re-member them through different funerary and memorial practices.
There has been a rise in the number of green or ecofriendly funerals in the
United States, in which companies process a corpse and mix the human remains
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with straw and wood chips to place in the ground as a compost to help grow plants
and flowers (Boylan, 2019). When actor Luke Perry died in 2019, he was buried in
a mushroom suit, which is a biodegradable suit that interacts with the decomposition of his corpse to turn his remains into nutrients that re-enter the ground (Pesce,
2019). These and related trends in mortuary practices (at least within the United
States) point to changing attitudes and relationships the living have with corpses
that strive to re-orient our relationship to the deceased vis-à-vis our understanding and appreciation for what corpses do in efforts to ‘make sense’ of death and
bring the irrationality and terror of death to a scientific, sensible, worldview. This
approach to dis-memberment compels the living person to think about the corpse
through processes of dis-memberment and the various ways one dis-members a
corpse: through a burial at sea, a cremation, a dissolution in a bath of sulfuric acid,
or mass burial in a grave or pit.
We can also see the corpse functioning as a curricular mode of re-membrance
in some of the memorial practices of death in Japan. Families take the bodies of
deceased family members away from hospital morgues and into their homes for an
overnight wake that lasts through the following morning upon which the corpse is
taken to a crematorium for remains to be cremated (Rich, 2017). As the population
of elderly persons approaching death reaches higher and higher numbers in Japan,
the country’s crematoria cannot rapidly process all of the corpses in need of cremation. As a result, itai hoteru, or “corpse hotels” in English, are spreading across
Japan as a service in which families can spend the night in rooms with their family
member’s corpse to properly practice mourning rites while the corpse then goes
back into storage for a later cremation (Blakemore, 2017). In these corpse hotels,
the corpse becomes a companion and a centerpiece. Spending the night with the
dead takes on a literal dimension in this sense as the living dis-members the once
living, by placing them in objects of death, such as a casket or coffin, and then
re-members the corpse, breaking it away from daily actions with the corpse as it
‘rests’ or ‘remains’ in a ‘final’ place, thus allowing for the human to be in contact
with these objects as conduits for remembering and recalling memories of the deceased as once living. We find the ease and acceptance of “living with the dead” (if
only for a night and a long morning) illustrative of the broader sets of affects and
practices that attend to rituals of wakes, viewings, and other ceremonies in which
we the living are not traumatized or in refusal of being in contact with the dead.
The corpse functions in this instance not as a subject of denial, but as an object of
celebration through both dis-membering and re-membering.
This celebration with the dead is not unique to Japanese corpse hotels. In
wakes, people gather to socialize and celebrate a deceased person, with the historical antecedent that mourners would stay awake with the dead until it was time
to bury the corpse, keeping a watch or vigil over the corpse in the home. Wakes,
viewings, funerals, and other mourning rituals may be seen as elaborate rituals for
the relatively simple process of chucking and discarding the remains of deceased
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persons, the very literal issue at heart of this journal’s special issue. But to commune
with the dead requires positioning the corpse as an object of celebration, commemoration, and reflection. In the United States, end-of-life ceremonies are changing
to become more convivial and less somber affairs, channeling grief into different
affective states in which the affective power of a corpse to move us is routed into
parties, celebrations, and other festive occasions (Heller, 2019). All of this may seem
infelicitous for opening new modes of thinking about mortality and corporeality in
curriculum thought, but the process of dis-membering and re-membering radically
shift what can be possible for reflection, a concept we find too grossly clichéd and
drained of vitality within educational and curricular practice.
If we take communing with the dead to mean the process of feeling in close
spiritual contact in one’s thoughts and feelings with someone deceased, we often
think of paranormal and supernatural scenarios such as seances, psychic medium
readings, or the use of Ouija boards to allow the living to re-member the deceased
into their community of living bodies. Yet, if we look back at the medieval history
of Europe, we would see that communing with the dead occurred outside of these
paranormal settings and involved both secular and sacred practices, practices that
appear to us in the twenty-first century as more akin to the celebratory nature funeral
services have adopted in recent years. For example, Rollo-Koster (2017) contends
that after one-third of Europe’s population died during the Black Death in the
fourteenth century, attitudes towards death became more dispassionate, quotidian,
and less fearful. Because corpses were, quite literally, everywhere, burying the
dead was a growing and increasingly important industry, intertwined with people
wishing to be buried close to saints. Pits were dug in the courtyards of churches,
tombs were carved out below churches, and some bodies were even buried within
church walls or placed in ornate cadaver tombs that feature effigies of the deceased
as a skeleton or a decomposing corpse.
According to Ariès (1977/1981), in his history of how Europeans have approached death, people danced and partied in cemeteries, often taking walks through
the graveyards of churches, for “the dead completely ceased to inspire fear” after
“a lessening of the aversion that the dead inspired” (p. 36). This orientation to how
we bring complacency and calm when surrounded by corpses (which emitted foul
odors inside the unrefrigerated churches) shows how a physical re-membering
alongside and with the dead reroutes affects of disgust and denial in the presence
of posthuman, living-dead assemblages amongst bodies and earth.

Corporeality and Mortality as a Curriculum of Disruption
We believe humans have very little incentive to consider the pedagogical aspects of corpses—and even are psychologically discouraged from doing so. Yet, the
disruptive potentialities arising from these corpse encounters are many. The places
where we encounter corporeality and mortality help us in asking Wallin’s question
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of how a life might go because they render visible some discomforting lessons about
humans’ mortality that disrupt our humanist sensibilities. Encountering a dead body
often triggers uncomfortable and difficult knowledge(s), disruptive moments of
learning in which the corpse becomes a curricular text producing “both cognitive
and affective responses of discomfort and unease” (Sandlin & Letts, 2014, p. 1).
In Philadelphia’s Mütter Museum of medical history, human anatomical anomalies are displayed for visitors in jars, glasses, cases, and through other technologies
of representation. The cadaverous collection of infantile corpses, mummified heads,
and preserved organs are meant to educate and enlighten, as evidenced in the museum’s tag line of enabling visitors to become ‘disturbingly informed’ (Aptowicz,
2014). Although the Mütter Museum focuses on representations of medical history
from the 19th century amidst a Victorian and Edwardian aesthetic, it is similar
to museums such as the anatomy and pathology collections in the United States
Defense Health Agency’s National Museum of Health and Medicine; the skinned
cadavers in France’s Musée Fragonard; and almost a thousand embalmed body
parts at the Museum Boerhaave in the Netherlands (Cichanowicz, 2016).
More contemporarily, Lee (2014) reminds us of the disorienting and disruptive
effects of the once massively popular Body Worlds exhibitions that traveled on
display around the world. These anatomical displays allowed visitors in science
museums and other places of learning “to view plastinated cadavers, posed in
striking arrangements of partial dissection and intactness” (p. 5). The disruptive
effects of the corpses on display in the Body World exhibits implicate the living
viewer to consider “violating notions of the human” such as in how one “flayed
specimen’s holding his “coat” of skin in his hand—and their flagrant use of human
tissues” disrupts the living’s comfortable sense of embodiedness (Lee, 2014, p.
5). This disruption is disclosed to the living viewer through “a speculated relation
between the carved-up tissues and a certain life narrative” (Lee, 2014, p. 5). By
collecting, curating, and exhibiting anatomical oddities, deformities, pathologies,
and specimens drawn from a multitude of corpses, these museums mean to educate
through affects of disruption in what could be argued as a morbid and macabre
curriculum of mortality and corporeality.
This disruption is akin to what Domanska (2005) sees as a frequent “exhumation
process” of our engagement with the dead in how our “treatment of dead bodies as
evidence introduces radical distance” between us, the living, as “subject” and the
corpse as an “object of analysis” working to force us in curriculum, as both students
and teachers, to consider “scientistic patterns of discourse about scientific truth,
objectivity… and the dead body’s helplessness to resist the violence of a variety of
discourses” (p. 403). Foucault (1963/1973) links different historical moments in the
Enlightenment to show how corpses, often operating as medical cadavers, functioned
as eminent sites of learning for scientists as well as sites of disciplining the medical
gaze of physicians. In this genealogy of medical knowledge, Foucault points out
the way corpses work as a kind of curriculum text, in which the corpse disrupted
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scientific and medical knowledge to work through the emergence of new knowledge
of the body and its mysteries. Working to disrupt prior regimes of knowledge, “the
corpse became the brightest moment in the figures of truth” through studying corpses
“where once larva was formed” (Foucault, 1963/1973, p. 125).
Foucault’s historical scene of the corpse and Enlightenment knowledge tracks
with how literature, art, and popular culture portray Enlightenment-era Europe as
full of zealous physicians, mad scientists, curious surgeons, robbing graves and experimenting on corpses in the vein of Dr. Frankenstein, all in the name of disrupting
what humans believed about the body and its capacities. These capacities are also at
work in what Shapira (2018) notes in a detailed study of how disruptive encounters
with human remains and corpses worked to “thrill” readers, scientists, and the public
in eighteenth-century Europe, whether the corpse is “riddled with worms or idealized
into an object of ethereal beauty” (p. 6). An effect of the Scientific Revolution and
Enlightenment has been to discipline and control the disruptive effects of the corpse
and the living’s encounters with human remains, whether they be in the form of
putrefying flesh of bodies rotting in a cobblestone street, or the limp bodies hanging
from gibbets in a town square, or the pockmarked and blackened skin of bodies that
succumbed to sickness, disease, malnourishment, famine, and lack of sanitation.
This approach to the corpse as a disruptive site of knowledge and awareness
for the living exists today in the form of body farms. In 2019 the United Kingdom
opened its first body farm, also known as a forensic cemetery or taphonomy facility,
which allows researchers to place corpses in open-air settings, shallow graves, and
floating pools to better observe and study processes of decomposition, skeletonization,
and fossilization (Adam, 2019). In the United States, the Forensic Anthropology
Center at the University of Tennessee Knoxville opened in 1980 and continues to
use donated corpses and human remains in the training of forensic anthropology
and skeletal biology (Fitter, 2019). In these spaces, the bodily materiality of the
corpse enlightens us and educates us through knowledge of what happens to bodies
after death. Considering this function of a corpse calls our attention to the many
things the living do with corpses: we dig graves and bury bodies, but also exhume
corpses when digging them up to study them; we dissect and inspect bodies through
autopsies and coroner reports; we experiment, embalm, and cremate corpses; and
we store corpses, sometimes for scientific and legal purposes, such as in laboratories
and morgues, and other times for purposes of sacred ritual and remembrance, such
as in charnel houses, crypts, and mausoleums.
When the corpse is used to educate and enlighten, it enacts what Frieze (2019)
identifies as an animating concern of a “forensic turn” in the humanities and social
sciences, a turn focused on discovering, identifying, and presenting evidence in an
objective, methodological way to unlock a secret or yield information, like the calculated and rational endeavors of a detective such as Sherlock Holmes or a forensic
investigator on Bones or CSI. According to Frieze (2019), “death is no barrier to the
flow of information that is the lifeblood of the forensic; and, in forensic culture, in-
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formation seems not only to cheat but to exert death” (emphasis his; p. 31). A critical
corpse studies would ask where and how the corpse has been used to disrupt received
wisdom of being human via a curriculum of corporeality and mortality.
As social studies educators, we both have encountered the corpse in our
teaching and our curricula as a disruptive object of instruction and explication.
In our history classes, for example, corpses appear in lessons on the guillotine in
the French Revolution; sacrifice in Mayan and Aztec civilizations; starvation as a
result of colonialism in nineteenth-century Ireland; the path of the plague during
the Black Death; the emaciated bodies in the concentration camps of the Holocaust; the genocide of peoples in the various slave trades around the world; the
high death toll of World War II and the obliterated bodies of victims of the atomic
bomb’s destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to name only a few of the more
gruesome and perennial topics in the social studies curriculum. These are perhaps
disciplinary ways a corpse disrupts historical knowledge, but we wish to briefly
discuss less intuitive ways that corpses disrupt our knowledge, in a subtle fashion,
through routes in the history curriculum that produce affective responses different
from disgust and denial found in the previous examples.
Our example is in teaching about ancient Egypt. In looking back at my teaching, I (Mark) recalled how prominent mummification was in my history curriculum
as a cipher for understanding complex beliefs, values, and histories entwined in
ancient Egyptian art, literature, and culture. When I have taught middle-grade
students about the process of how Egyptians mummified bodies, I would lead
students through a process of mummifying apples with salt and baking soda. The
objective of the lesson was less on teaching the natural processes of decomposition that leads to the skeletonization and disintegration of bodies, but rather on
the processes of how Egyptians worshipped, commemorated, and celebrated the
dead, with ornamental sarcophagi and jewelry; canopic jars that stored a body’s
viscera and organs; hieroglyphic inscriptions in funerary tombs; and mythological
sources for ancient Egyptian beliefs in the afterlife. And yet the affective power of
mummifying apples with my students was not in the aesthetic choices we made to
adorn our mummies; rather, it occurred in our comprehension and observation of
the decomposition of the apple itself. We watched it shrivel up, wrinkle, putrefy,
and become, by all outward appearances, “dead,” an apple corpse.
Later, when my students and I would travel to a local history museum in our
city to view an ancient Egyptian mummy exhibited in a display of the museum
founder’s (politically and ethically questionable) trips to Egypt in the 1920s to
collect ancient artifacts, we would think about our apples as we gazed at the body
in the enclosed glass display. That gaze becomes a mechanism through which our
engagement with corpses so often transpires as an educative act. Life, in these
instances of gazing, is disrupted with thinking about the dead and “make of death
an object of affirmation and joy, rather than one of fear, sorrow, and negation…as
the absolute possible of our being” (Locke, 2016, p. 23).
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The mummified corpse functioned for me and my students as an object lesson
in death and in considering the very concept of ancient Egypt as weird and eerie,
feelings that disrupted what we take for granted not only about being alive, but in
the ways of becoming-corpse in our modern era that make ancient Egyptian mortuary practices feel so alien and unsettling. Fisher (2016) approaches the eerie as
when something is absent or unaccounted for and we cannot explain or know why,
a disruptive sense of absence through dread, and the weird as that which arrests our
attention because it makes us confront something we see that feels out of place,
threatening, disorienting, or inexplicable, a disruptive sense of presence through
dread. The mummy’s corpse and its items in the glass display case made ancient
Egypt weird for me and my students because seeing clay jars containing body organs
and large metal hooks utilized to remove brain tissue through the corpse’s nose are
disorienting, a disturbing presence that makes us think “it should not exist” through
“a sensation of wrongness” (Fisher, 2016, p. 15). It is not that this preserved corpse
and the jars for its organs and the tools for its dismemberment and preservation
are inherently wrong, invalid, or illogical; rather, the affects of the weird are that
we are seeing these things in a space where we often do not or feel we should not
gaze upon them—a museum, a place of learning and ‘appropriate’ things, as is our
relation to schools.
These disruptive affects may amount to what Thacker (2015b) calls “the limit
of thought, human characters confronted with the limit of the human” that unsettles
our foundations for making sense of being in a human-centric world (p. 11). This
unease corresponds to what Kristeva (1980/1982) theorizes about the abjection
we find in corpses. The insistent materiality of death, for Kristeva, disrupts us
when we see a corpse, especially a corpse of someone we know or love, because it
makes confronting our own mortality more real and visceral. The disruption from
a corpse is an instance of “death infecting life” as the corpse draws our desire to
the compulsion of facing up to death through the abjection of the corpse (Kristeva,
1980/1982, p. 4). We can endeavor across our disciplinary fields to work towards
a spirit of curriculum that approaches corporeality and morality for this purpose,
tracing disruptive moments when death infects life and unsettles us.

A Final Rest: Concluding Thoughts
Our forays into a critical corpse studies have illustrated how the corpse activates
curricular modes of disgust, denial, dis-/re-memberment, and disruption. Animated
by our realization that certain bodies are privileged over others in curriculum, we
have found thinking with and through the corpse informative insofar as it opens
up new possibilities for thinking about relations between life/death, the living/
the dead, the corporeal/incorporeal, and the human/nonhuman. The fluids in our
bodies remind us of our status as creatures, and if we can overcome our denial
of death and our associated creatureliness, we might engage in a different ethics.
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Despite the topic being one of corpses and death, we find this area of inquiry to be
hopeful: “To be a creature is to accept our dependence and limitedness in a way
that does not result in disaffection and despair. It is rather the condition for courage
and endurance” (Critchley, 2009, p. 248-249). This hope is not about a command
to be happy and deny the troubling times within which we find ourselves. Rather,
this hope is radical in the sense of Lear (2006)—a hope that taps into our shared
vulnerability in precarious times.
What can educators and curricularists try to do to achieve a radically hopeful
way of being that becomes more attentive through disgust, denial, dis-memberment,
and disruption? First, in order to pluck up the intestinal fortitude required to face
our mortality, we need conceptual tools. Without such tools, the potentialities of
educational engagements with corporeal curriculum are limited. As discussed in
this article, these educational engagements with mortality can help us live. Perhaps
we might treat our finite lives as May (2009) suggests—like we would an antique
watch. He doesn’t want us to keep it in a museum or locked away at home so that
we cannot really engage with it, but neither does he want us to treat the watch in
a cavalier way. Instead, we might be “careful: not neurotically careful, but careful
in the way of enjoying it without abusing it” (p. 86). Through a consideration of
corpses, we might disrupt our patterns of denial and instead embrace our status as
interconnected creatures living among others on the planet. At the very least, we
must acknowledge that in educative spaces ignoring and denying death simply will
not do and is educative malpractice.
Secondly, we can implicate ourselves in a pedagogy and curriculum that pursues lessons in which a human becoming a corpse is not an end to a body’s agency
in the world, and, as such, exists as an educational site. In particular, experiences
with corpses and their fluids have a curricular potential not only to teach us about
our resistance to the idea of death but also to help us resist overly rational, disembodied, and narrowly-focused learning outcomes. Corpses are not the waste of a
living body, and rejecting their power does us a disservice. The fact that a corpse
is an assemblage of tissues, viscera, bacteria, fluids, odors, and always in flux
molecularly render the corpse a dynamic curricular vessel.
Whether we teach literally with corpses, as perhaps common in a biology or
anatomy course, or figurative, as perhaps in a literature or history course, we can
resist any arresting nature of thought through the corpse’s decomposition, its array
of cultural, historical, biological, chemical, and political meaning(s) that always
gesture and refer to something else: a Great Beyond, an afterlife, a pine box, a
memorial shrine, a crematorium, a hole in the ground six feet under, ashes spread
in the wind, a body rotting into the soil, a DNA sample, a dental record, something
that is no longer with ‘us’ the living. Through a recognition of these and other
examples of a corpse’s place in the word we are forced to consider what we have
neglected, and thus opens up the space to imagine more meaningful educational
encounters in schools and beyond.

160

Critical Corpse Studies

References
Adam, D. (2019, May 2). UK to open first ‘body farm’ for forensic research. Nature: International Journal of Science (n.p.). Retrieved from https://www.nature.com/articles/
d41586-019-01436-8
Alaimo, S. (2010). Bodily natures: Science, environment, and the material self. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press.
Alaimo, S. (2018). Trans-corporeality. In R. Braidotti & M. Hlavajova (Eds.), Posthuman
glossary (pp. 435-438). London, UK: Bloomsbury.
Aptowicz, C. O. (2014). Dr. Mütter’s marvels: A true tale of intrigue and innovation at the
dawn of modern medicine. New York, NY: Penguin Random House.
Ariès, P. (1981). The hour of our death. (H. Weaver, Trans.). New York, NY: Knopf. (Original
work published in 1977)
Backderf, D. (2012). My friend Dahmer. New York, NY: Abrams ComicArts.
Baldwin, J. (1962, November 17). Letter from a region in my mind. The New Yorker. Retrieved from http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1962/11/17/letter-from-a-regionin-my-mind
Bataille, G. (1986). Eroticism: Death and sensuality. San Francisco, CA: First City Lights.
Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York, NY: Free Press.
Becker, E. (1975). Escape from evil. New York, NY: Free Press.
Black, R., Gray, E. M., & Leahy, D. (2016). Zombies, monsters and education: The creation
of the young citizen. In V. Carrington, J. Rowsell, E. Priyadharshini, & R. Westrup
(Eds.), Generation Z: Cultural studies and transdisciplinarity in education (pp. 159172).New York, NY: Springer.
Blakemore, E. (2017, July 5). “Corpse Hotels” are in demand in Japan. Smithsonian Magazine
(n.p.). Retrieved from https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/corpse-hotelsare-demand-japan-180963924/
Boylan, D. (2019, May 28). Washington becomes first state to legalize ‘green funerals.’
Washington Times. Retrieved from https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/
may/28/washington-becomes-first-state-legalize-green-fune/
Bradley, J. P. (2018). Cerebra: “All-Human”,“All-Too-Human”,“All-Too-Transhuman”.
Studies in Philosophy and Education, 37(4), 401-415. doi:10.1007/s11217-018-9609-4.
Braidotti, R. (2013). The posthuman. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Brier, B. (2013). Egyptomania: Our three thousand year obsession with the land of the
Pharaohs. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.
Britzman, D. (2002). The death of curriculum? In W. E. Doll, Jr. & N. Gough (Eds.), Curriculum visions (pp. 92-101). New York, NY: Peter Lang.
Brooks, P. (1993). Body work: Objects of desire in modern narrative. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Brown, D. J. (2009). The indifferent stars above: The harrowing story of the Donner Party.
New York, NY: HarperCollins.
Cichanowicz, L. (2016, October 19). The world’s 10 most fascinating medical museums.
CultureTrip (n.p.). Retrieved from https://theculturetrip.com/north-america/usa/articles/
the-worlds-10-most-fascinating-medical-museums/
Cohut, M. (2018, May 11). What happens to the body after death? Medical News Today.
Retrieved from https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/321792.php
Critchley, S. (2009) The book of dead philosophers. New York, NY: Vintage.

Mark Helmsing & Cathryn van Kessel

161

Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1987). A thousand plateaus. (B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Original work published in 1980)
Derrida, J. (1993). Aporias: Dying–awaiting (one another at) the “limits of truth.” (T. Dutoit,
Trans.). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. (Original work published in 1993)
Domanska, E. (2005). Toward the archaeontology of the dead body (Trans. M. Zapedowska).
Rethinking History, 9(4), p. 389–413. doi:10.1080/13642520500307602
Donald, D. T. (2009). Forts, curriculum, and Indigenous Métissage: Imagining decolonization
of Aboriginal-Canadian relations in educational contexts. First Nations Perspectives,
2(1), 1-24.
Doughty, M. (2014). Smoke gets in your eyes & other lessons from the crematory. New York,
NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
Edwards, C. (1993). The politics of immorality in ancient Rome. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Edwards, E. E. (2018). The modernist corpse. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Edwards, J. D., & Graulund, R. (2013). Grotesque. New York, NY: Routledge.
Ellam, J. & Pielak, C. (2018). Corpse encounters: An aesthetics of death. Lanham, MA:
Lexington Books.
Felluga, D. F. (2015). Critical theory: The key concepts. New York, NY: Routledge.
Fisher, M. (2016). The weird and the eerie. London, UK: Repeater.
Fitter, F. (2019, February 28). My afterlife on the body farm. New York Times (n.p.). Retrieved
from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/well/live/my-afterlife-on-the-body-farm.html
Flinders, D. J. (2016). Zombie ideas refuse to die. Curriculum and Teaching Dialogue,
16(1), xvii-xxii.
Foucault, M. (1973). The birth of the clinic: An archaeology of medical perception (A.
Sheridan, Trans.). London, UK: Tavistock Publications/Vintage Books. (Original work
published in 1963)
Frieze, J. (2019). Theatrical performance and the forensic turn. New York, NY: Routledge.
Gough, N. (2004). RhizomANTically becoming-cyborg: Performing posthuman pedagogies. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 36(3), 253-265. doi:10.1111/j.14695812.2004.00066.x
Gruen, E. S. (1990). Studies in Greek culture and Roman policy. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press.
Haraway, D. J. (2016). Staying with the trouble: Making kin in the Chthulucene. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Harrington, A. (1969). The immortalist. New York, NY: Avon Books.
Heller, K. (2019, April 15). The funeral as we know it is becoming a relic—just in time for
a death boom. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/
lifestyle/style/the-funeral-as-we-know-it-is-becoming-a-relic--just-in-time-for-a-deathboom/2019/04/14/a49003c4-50c2-11e9-8d28-f5149e5a2fda_story.html
Hirschberger, G., Pyszczynski, T., Ein-Dor, T., Shani Sherman, T., Kadah, E., Kesebir, P., &
Park, Y. C. (2016). Fear of death amplifies retributive justice motivations and encourages political violence. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 22, 67-74.
doi:10.1037/pac0000129
Huddleston, G. (2016). The zombie in the room: Using popular culture as an apparatus.
In N. Snaza, D. Sonu, S.E. Truman, & Z. Zaliwska (Eds.), Pedagogical matters: New
materialisms and curriculum studies (pp. 109-122). New York, NY: Peter Lang.
Kristeva, J. (1982). Powers of horror: An essay on objection (Trans. L. S. Rudiez). New York,

162

Critical Corpse Studies

NY: Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1980)
Lear, J. (2006). Radical hope: Ethics in the face of cultural devastation. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Lee, R. C. (2014). The exquisite corpse of Asian America: Biopolitics, biosociality, and
posthuman ecologies. New York, NY: New York University Press.
Lewis, T., & Kahn, R. (2010). Education out of bounds: Reimagining cultural studies for a
posthuman age. New York, NY: Palgrave.
Livy. (1970). Roman history (vol. 11, Trans. E. Sage). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Locke, T. A. (2016). The living and the dead. London, UK: Repeater.
May, T. (2009). Death. New York, NY: Routledge.
Mbembe, A. (2003). Necropolitics (Trans. L. Meintjes). Public Culture, 15(1), 11-40.
McBrien, J. (2016). Accumulating extinction: Planetary catastrophe in the necrocene. In
J. W. Moore (Ed.), Anthropocene or Capitalocene: Nature, history, and the crisis of
capitalism (pp. 116-137). Oakland, CA: PM Press.
Meagher, R. E. (1995). Euripides Bakkhai. Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci.
Meyers, M. (Director & Producer). (2017). My friend Dahmer [Motion picture]. United
States: FilmRise.
Ndalianis, A. (2012). The horror sensorium: Media and the senses. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
Pesce, N.L. (2019, May 8). Luke Perry was buried in a mushroom suit—which could
become a trend. MarketWatch. Retrieved from https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
the-woman-who-made-luke-perrys-mushroom-burial-suit-is-shaking-up-the-deathcare-market-2019-05-07
Puar, J. K. (2007). Terrorist assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press.
Pyszczynski, T., Abdollahi, A., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., & Weise, D.
(2006). Mortality salience, martyrdom, and military might: The Great Satan versus the Axis of Evil. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 525-537.
doi:10.1177/0146167205282157
Reynolds, M. (2014, February 28). Sheldon Solomon: Psych professor & Skidmore legend.
Her Campus at Skidmore. Retrieved from https://www.hercampus.com/school/skidmore/
sheldon-solomon-psych-professor-skidmore-legend
Rich, M. (2017, July 1). Crematory is booked? Japan offers corpse hotels. New York
Times (n.p.). Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/01/world/asia/japan-corpse-hotels.html?
Roberts, T.-A., Goldenberg, J. L., Power, C., & Pyszczynski, T. (2002). “Feminine protection”: The effects of menstruation on attitudes toward women. Psychology of Women
Quarterly, 26(2), 131-139. doi:10.1111/1471-6402.00051
Rollo-Koster, J. (Ed.). (2017). Death in medieval Europe: Death scripted and death choreographed. New York, NY: Routledge.
Sandlin, J. A. & Letts, W. (2014). What an eight-foot-long mega colon taught us about attending to uncomfortable knowledge. Journal of Curriculum & Pedagogy, 11(1), 1-4.
doi:10.1080/15505170.2014.914320
Schimel, J., Hayes, J., Williams, T., & Jahrig, J. (2007). Is death really the worm at the core?
Converging evidence that worldview threat increases death-thought accessibility. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(5), 789-803. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.92.5.789

Mark Helmsing & Cathryn van Kessel

163

Schulte, C. M. (2019). Wild encounters: A more-than-human approach to children’s drawing.
Studies in Art Education, 60(2), 92-102. doi:10.1080/00393541.2019.1600223
Schwartz, M. (2015). The meaning of iconic corpses. Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press.
Shapira, Y. (2018). Inventing the gothic corpse: The thrill of human remains in the eighteenth-century novel. London, UK: Palgrave.
Snaza, N. (2014). The death of curriculum studies and its ghosts. Journal of Curriculum
and Pedagogy, 11(2), 154-173. doi:10.1080/15505170.2014.966932
Snaza, N., & Weaver, J. (Eds.). (2014). Posthumanism and educational research. New York,
NY: Routledge.
Sonu, D., & Snaza, N. (2015). The fragility of ecological pedagogy: Elementary social studies
standards and possibilities of new materialism. Journal of Curriculum and Pedagogy,
12(3), 258-277. doi:10.1080/15505170.2015.1103671
Springgay, S., & Truman, S. E. (2017). Stone walks: Inhuman animacies and queer archives
of feeling. Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 38(6), 851-863.
doi: 10.1080/01596306.2016.1226777
Suazo, K. (2017, June 23). A friendly guide to exactly how a dead body decomposes. Buzzfeed. Retrieved from https://www.buzzfeed.com/kaylasuazo/the-stages-of-body-decomposition
Tallbear, K. (2016, March 16). Failed settler kinship, truth and reconciliation, and science.
Indigenous Science Technology Society Retrieved from http://indigenoussts.com/
failed-settler-kinship-truth-and-reconciliation-and-science/
Thacker, E. (2011). In the dust of this planet: Horror of philosophy, Volume 1. Winchester,
UK/Washington, DC: Zero Books.
Thacker, E. (2015a). Starry speculative corpse: Horror of philosophy, Volume 2. Winchester,
England/Washington, DC: Zero Books.
Thacker, E. (2015b). Tentacles longer than night: Horror of philosophy, Volume 3. Winchester,
UK/Washington, DC: Zero Books.
Truman, S. E. (2019). Inhuman literacies and affective refusals: Thinking with Sylvia Wynter
and secondary school English. Curriculum Inquiry, 1-19. doi:10.1080/03626784.20
18.1549465
Turcan, R. (1997). The cults of the Roman empire (Trans. A. Nevill). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Urmacher, P. B. (2014). Zombies in the midst: Education, identity, or the lack thereof.
Curriculum and Teaching Dialogue, 16(2), p. 3-8.
Ussher, J. (1989). The psychology of the female body. New York, NY: Routledge.
Van Kessel, C. (2019). An education in ‘evil’: Implications for curriculum, pedagogy, and
beyond. New York, NY: Palgrave.
Van Kessel, C., & Burke, K. (2018). Teaching as immortality project: Positing weakness in
response to terror. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 53(2), 216-229. doi:10.1111/14679752.12301
Wallin, J. (2013). Putrid deadagogies: Zombie life and the rise of the chaosmopolis. In J.
Burdick, J.A. Sandlin, & M.P. O’Malley (Eds.), Problematizing public pedagogy (pp.
40-51). New York, NY: Routledge.
Wallin, J. (2016). To die well: The death of death in curriculum. In W.M. Reynolds & J.A.
Webber (Eds.), Expanding curriculum theory: Dis/positions and lines of flight (2nd
ed.) (pp. 44-61). New York, NY: Routledge.

164

Critical Corpse Studies

Wallis, M. (2017). The best land under heaven: The Donner Party in the age of Manifest
Destiny. New York, NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation/W.W. Norton & Company.
Yalom, M. (1997). A history of the breast. New York, NY: Knopf.
Zembylas, M. (2018). The entanglement of decolonial and posthuman perspectives: Tensions
and implications for curriculum and pedagogy in higher education. Parallax, 24(3),
254-267. doi:10.1080/13534645.2018.1496577

